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COMMENT
PRIVACY AND THE ALASKA
CONSTITUTION: FAILING TO
FULFILL THE PROMISE
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY*
In this Comment, the Author examines two recent Alaska Supreme Court decisions regarding privacy rights and contends that
the Alaska Supreme Court failed to protect the greater privacy
rights granted under the Alaska Constitution. The Comment considers the issues confronted by the Alaska Supreme Court and
compares the decisions with United States Supreme Court decisions examining similar issues. The Author concludes by considering the implication of these decisions as well as urging the
Alaska Supreme Court to aggressively uphold the protections of
privacy granted in the Alaska Constitution.

I. INTRODUCTION
Most Americans would be surprised to learn that there is no
right to privacy granted in the United States Constitution. The
Fourth Amendment protects privacy in limiting police searches and
1
arrests, but privacy in terms of autonomy and the right to be let
alone by the government is not mentioned in the text of the Constitution. Unfortunately, the first United States Supreme Court deciCopyright © 2003 by Erwin Chemerinsky. This Comment is also available on the
Internet at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/20ALRChemerinsky.
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political
Science, University of Southern California. Visiting Professor, Duke University
School of Law, Fall 2002. I want to thank Diara Fleming for her excellent research assistance.
1. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.” U.S. CONST. Amend IV.
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sion to speak expressly of privacy, in the sense of personal auton2
omy, has a shaky foundation. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the
3
use of contraceptives. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
found the right to privacy in the “penumbra” of the First, Third,
4
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. As one commentator described
it, Justice Douglas “skipped through the Bill of Rights like a
cheerleader - ‘Give me a P . . . give me an R . . . an I . . .,’ and so on,
5
and found P-R-I-V-A-C-Y as a derivative or penumbral right.”
In sharp contrast, the Alaska Constitution expressly safeguards privacy rights. Article I, section 22 states that the “right of
6
the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.”
Similarly, article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution provides
that “all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, [and] the pur7
suit of happiness.” The Supreme Court of Alaska furthered this
concept when it stated that “at the core of this concept [of liberty]
is the notion of total personal immunity from governmental con8
trol: the right ‘to be let alone.’”
Alaska constitutional law is clear that greater rights can be
protected under the Alaska Constitution than are recognized under
9
the United States Constitution. As the Alaska Supreme Court declared in Roberts v. State, “We are not bound in expounding the
Alaska Constitution’s Declaration of Rights by the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, past or future, which expound identical or closely similar provisions of the United States Constitu10
tion.” Indeed, the first Alaska Supreme Court decision interpreting the privacy clause of the Alaska Constitution—added by
voter initiative in 1972—upheld the constitutional right of indi11
Justice Rabinowitz,
viduals to use marijuana in their homes.
writing for the court, stated that residents of Alaska “have a basic
right to privacy in their homes under Alaska’s Constitution . . . .
2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3. Id. at 485.
4. Id. at 484-85.
5. Robert G. Dixon, The “New” Substantive Due Process and the Democratic
Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 BYU L. REV. 43, 84 (1976).
6. ALASKA CONST., art. 1, § 22.
7. Id. art. 1, § 1.
8. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 168 (Alaska 1972).
9. Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342 (Alaska 1969).
10. Id. For an excellent defense of the protection of greater rights under the
Alaska Constitution, see Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the “Last Frontier,” Professor Gardner: Alaska’s Independent Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 12 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (1995).
11. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975).

CHEMERINSKY_CORRECTED.DOC

05/07/03 4:36 PM

2003] PRIVACY AND THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION

31

[This right] would encompass the possession and ingestion of substances such as marijuana in a purely personal, non-commercial
12
context . . . .”
The Alaska Supreme Court continues, at times, to provide
greater protection for privacy rights under the Alaska Constitution
than under the United States Constitution. For example, in Alaska
13
Department of Health & Social Services v. Planned Parenthood,
the Alaska Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law
that prohibited Medicaid funding of abortions unless the pregnant
woman is at risk of dying from her pregnancy or the pregnancy re14
sults from rape or incest. The court found that the denial of
Medicaid assistance to poor women who medically require abor15
tions violates equal protection under the Alaska Constitution,
even though the United States Supreme Court has concluded that
the failure to fund abortions does not violate the United States
16
Similarly, in State v. Planned Parenthood,17 the
Constitution.
Alaska Supreme Court held that the State could require parental
consent for an unmarried minor’s abortion only if it proved a compelling interest in enforcing the parental consent statute and that
18
the statute was properly tailored to promote the State’s interest.
The United States Supreme Court, in contrast, has consistently upheld parental notice and/or consent requirements so long as there
is an alternative procedure whereby a minor can obtain an abortion
if doing so would be in her best interest or if she is mature enough
19
to decide for herself.

12. Id. at 504; see also Rollins v. Ulmer, 15 P.3d 749, 754 (Alaska 2001) (upholding a registration requirement for medical use of marijuana); Walker v. State,
991 P.2d 799, 803 (Alaska 1999) (upholding the prohibition of possession of more
than eight ounces of marijuana as possession with intent to sell).
13. 28 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2001).
14. Id. at 915.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980) (holding that a state
was not required to pay for abortions when it would not be reimbursed by the federal government); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality of denying funding for abortions).
17. 35 P.3d 30 (Alaska 2001).
18. Id. at 46.
19. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979); see also Ohio v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510-13 (1990) (finding an Ohio judicial bypass statute to be constitutional because the statute allowed the minor to
show she had the maturity to make the decision or that the abortion was in her
best interest, preserved the minor’s anonymity, and set appropriate time limits on
judicial action); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 422-23 (1990) (upholding
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Against this backdrop, several recent decisions of the Alaska
Supreme Court are troubling in their rejection of privacy claims
under the Alaska Constitution. In this Comment, I examine two
recent decisions denying protection of privacy under the Alaska
20
Constitution. In Sampson v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court re21
fused to find protection for a right to physician-assisted suicide,
and in Anchorage Police Department Employees Ass’n v. Anchor22
age, the court upheld a drug testing policy for police and fire department employees, without individualized suspicion, when indi23
viduals applied for employment, promotion, or transfer.
These decisions should be of concern because they reject a
right of privacy in areas of particular importance and may signal a
retreat from more extensive protection of privacy under the Alaska
Constitution. At the very least, these rulings fail to live up to the
broad interpretation of privacy under the Alaska Constitution ar24
ticulated by Justice Rabinowitz in his early opinions.
Part II of this Comment examines the Sampson ruling, in
which the court rejected the right to physician-assisted suicide.
Part III analyzes Anchorage Police Department and the allowance
of drug testing without individual suspicion for certain municipal
employees. Finally, the Comment concludes by considering the potential implications of these decisions and argues for aggressive
protection of privacy under the Alaska Constitution.
II. PRIVACY AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
A. The United States Supreme Court’s Rejection of a Right to
Physician-Assisted Suicide
Few Supreme Court decisions have the possibility of touching
as many lives, directly or indirectly, as those holding that there is
no constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. Washington v.
25
26
Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill effectively uphold laws in forty-

requirements for parental notice and/or consent for unmarried minors’ abortions
so long as there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure).
20. 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001).
21. Id. at 100.
22. 24 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001).
23. Id. at 556-57.
24. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975) (recognizing a
privacy interest for “possession of marijuana by adults at home for personal use”).
25. 521 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1997) (holding that laws prohibiting physicianassisted suicide do not violate a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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nine states that prohibit aiding another in committing suicide.
However, although the decisions were rendered without a single
dissent, they leave open the possibility of legal protection for such
a right at the state level, either under state constitutions, such as
Alaska’s, or state statutes, such as Oregon’s “Death With Dignity
27
Act.”
In Glucksberg and Quill, the Court had before it two court of
appeals decisions that found a constitutional right to physicianassisted suicide. The Ninth Circuit, in an en banc decision, found
that terminally ill individuals have a fundamental liberty interest to
physician-assisted suicide, protected under the Due Process Clause
28
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court declared unconstitutional a Washington law stipulating that “[a] person is guilty of
promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids an29
other person to commit suicide.” The court then concluded that
“the Constitution encompasses a Due Process liberty interest in
controlling the time and manner of one’s death—that there is, in
30
short, a constitutionally recognized ‘right to die.’”
Just a few weeks after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the Second
Circuit declared unconstitutional a New York law that prohibited
26. 521 U.S. 793, 796-97 (1997) (holding that laws prohibiting physicianassisted suicide do not violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
27. ORE. REV. STAT. §127.800 (1996) (specifically allowing physician-assisted
suicide).
Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a directive in November 2001 challenging Oregon’s act. The directive declares that:
•
controlled substances may not be dispensed to assist suicide, thus
reversing the position taken by his predecessor, Attorney General
Janet Reno, in June 1998.
•
assisting suicide is not a “legitimate medical purpose” and that prescribing, dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances
violates the [Controlled Substance Act].
•
prescribing, dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances to assist suicide may “render [a physician’s] registration . . .
inconsistent with the public interest” and therefore subject to possible suspension or revocation . . . .
Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1078-79 (D. Ore. 2002) (quoting 66 FR
56608 (Nov. 9, 2002)). The State of Oregon sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the directive. Id. at 1084. The district court entered a permanent injunction “enjoining the defendants from enforcing, applying,
or otherwise giving any legal effect to the Ashcroft directive.” Id. at 1080.
28. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc) (emphasis in original), rev’d sub nom. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
29. Id. at 794 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (2000)) (emphasis in
original).
30. Id. at 816.
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aiding another in committing suicide.31 Several physicians and
gravely ill patients challenged the New York statute, which stated
that “[a] person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree
when . . . [h]e intentionally causes or aids another person to commit
32
suicide.” The Second Circuit found that the New York law vio33
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court reasoned that competent patients on artificial life support already have the right to physician-assisted suicide based on
34
their right to terminate life support equipment. In Cruzan v. Di35
rector, Missouri Department of Health, the Supreme Court ruled
that competent adults have the right to refuse even life-sustaining
36
medical treatment. The Second Circuit said that in light of this
decision, those not receiving artificial life support are discriminated
against because they do not have a right to physician-assisted sui37
cide. The court concluded that this latter group is denied equal
38
protection.
The United States Supreme Court reversed both of these court
of appeals decisions. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority in each case. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court rejected
the claim that the Washington law prohibiting assisted suicide violated a fundamental right protected under the Due Process
39
Clause. Rehnquist’s opinion began by observing that a right is
protected as fundamental under the Due Process Clause when sup40
ported by history or tradition. Rehnquist then stated that “for
over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has
punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and attempting
41
suicide.”
Rehnquist noted that “[i]n almost every State—indeed, in al42
most every western democracy—it is a crime to assist a suicide.”
After reviewing the history of laws prohibiting suicide and assis31. Quill, 80 F.3d at 731.
32. Id. at 719 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1987)).
33. Id. at 731.
34. Id. at 727-28. The pre-existing right the court spoke about was the right to
termination of life support equipment, which is not necessarily equivalent to physician-assisted suicide.
35. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
36. Id. at 261.
37. Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
38. Id. at 731.
39. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
40. Id. at 710 (stating that history is where the analysis of whether a right is a
protected right should begin).
41. Id. at 711.
42. Id. at 710.
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tance of suicide, Rehnquist wrote, “Despite changes in medical
technology and notwithstanding an increased emphasis on the importance of end-of-life decisionmaking, we have not retreated from
43
this prohibition [of assisting suicide].” The Court thus concluded
that “[t]o hold for respondents, we would have to reverse centuries
of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered pol44
icy choice of almost every state.”
Because the Court determined that “the asserted ‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Due Process clause,” the Washington law was to
45
be upheld so long as it met a rational basis test. The Court found
that the law reasonably served many legitimate interests, including
the preservation of life, protecting the integrity and ethics of the
medical profession, protecting vulnerable groups, and stopping the
46
path to voluntary and even involuntary euthanasia.
Similarly, in Quill, the Supreme Court held that a New York
law prohibiting physician-assisted suicide did not violate the Equal
47
Protection Clause. Chief Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the
majority, initially noted that the prohibition of assisted suicide in
this particular statute neither discriminated against a suspect class
(such as a racial minority) nor violated a fundamental right since
48
Glucksberg had expressly repudiated those contentions. Under
equal protection analysis, this meant that the law should be upheld
49
so long as it met a rational basis test.
Moreover, the Court rejected the claim that New York’s law
50
discriminated against anyone. In its decision, the Court noted
that New York’s law treated everyone equally, that all people have
the right to refuse medical care, and that all people are prohibited
51
from assisting another person in committing suicide. The Court
specifically disagreed with the Second Circuit’s conclusion that
those not on artificial life support are discriminated against as
compared with those who can receive physician-assisted suicide by
demanding the termination of a respirator or artificial nutrition or
hydration, calling it a “distinction [which] comports with funda-

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 719.
Id. at 723.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 728, 731-32.
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 809 (1997).
Id. at 799.
Id.
Id. at 800.
Id.
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mental legal principles of causation and intent.”52 The Court explained that “when a patient refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a
patient ingests lethal medication prescribed by a physician, he is
53
killed by that medication.”
The Supreme Court’s refusal to find a right to physicianassisted suicide under the United States Constitution does not pro54
hibit states from protecting such a right. The Court has emphasized the general absence of constitutional limits on state-assisted
55
suicide laws. In other words, the issue of whether there is a right
to die is left to the political process and state constitutions; states
may prohibit or allow physician-assisted suicide largely unconstrained by the Constitution. For example, in 1994, Oregon enacted through a ballot initiative a “Death With Dignity Act,” which
legalized physician-assisted suicide for competent, terminally ill
56
adults.
B. The Alaska Supreme Court Rejects a Right to PhysicianAssisted Suicide
Despite the enumeration of a right to privacy under the
Alaska Constitution, the Alaska Supreme Court in Sampson v.
57
State also rejected a constitutional right to physician-assisted sui58
cide. Kevin Sampson and Jane Doe were mentally competent,
terminally ill patients who sought a court order that they had a
right to physician-assisted suicide under the Alaska Constitution
and thus that their physicians should be exempt from prosecution
59
Specifically, Sampson and Doe confor aiding their suicides.
tended that “the guarantees of privacy and liberty in article I of the

52. Id. at 801.
53. Id.
54. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 716-19 (1997) (discussing the
recent development of movements in some states to rethink the ban on physicianassisted suicide, all of which, save Oregon, have ended with no change in the ban).
55. See id. at 716 (noting that states have reexamined and reaffirmed bans on
assisted-suicide).
56. Oregon Rev. Stat. §127.800 et seq. The statute reads: “An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to be suffering from a terminal illness, and who has
voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die, may make a written request for medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified manner . . . .” § 127.805 § 2.01(1).
57. 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001).
58. Id. at 90.
59. Id.
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Alaska Constitution protect their right to control the timing and
60
manner of their deaths.”
The Alaska Supreme Court began by observing that since
Alaska became a state there had always been a law prohibiting as61
sisted suicide. The court noted that the Alaska legislature had
considered a bill, closely resembling Oregon’s law, to allow physi62
cian-assisted suicide, but that it failed to pass. The court then reviewed the Alaska cases concerning the right to privacy and concluded that “[a]ll of these cases address situations involving
personal autonomy to control our appearance or to direct the
course of our lives; none even remotely hints at any historical or legal support for the proposition that the general right of personal
63
autonomy incorporates a right to physician-assisted suicide.”
The court thus expressly rejected the claim that there is a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide under the Alaska Con64
stitution. The court then proceeded to apply mere rational basis
review and, not surprisingly, found that this deferential standard
65
66
was met. Like the United States Supreme Court in Glucksberg
67
and Quill, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the State has
a “strong interest in protecting potentially vulnerable Alaskans, in68
cluding terminally ill persons, from undue influence.” The court
also expressed concern over how “mental competence” would be
defined or determined, as the plaintiffs sought a right to physician69
assisted suicide only for such individuals. Similarly, the court said
that it would be difficult to limit such a right to “terminally ill pa70
tients.”
The court said that these problems might be dealt with, but
“because . . . suicide is so firmly rooted in questions of social policy,

60. Id. at 91 (citation and quotations omitted).
61. Id. at 92. Currently under Alaska law, “[a] person commits the crime of
manslaughter if the person . . . intentionally aids another person to commit suicide.” ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(2) (Michie 2002); see also id. § 11.15.150 (repealed 1978).
62. Sampson, 31 P.3d at 93.
63. Id. at 94.
64. Id. at 95 (“[W]e reject Sampson and Doe’s contention that physicianassisted suicide is a fundamental right within the core meaning of the Alaska Constitution’s privacy and liberty clauses.”).
65. See id. at 95-96.
66. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
67. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
68. Sampson, 31 P.3d at 96.
69. Id. at 97.
70. Id.
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rather than constitutional tradition, it is a quintessentially legisla71
tive matter.” The court thus concluded
[a]ccordingly, we hold that the right to physician-assisted suicide
is not implicit in text, context, or history of the Alaska Constitution’s liberty and privacy clauses. While these guarantees encompass a broad range of autonomy, they do not require an exemption to Alaska’s manslaughter statute that would provide for
72
physician-assisted suicide.

C. The Alaska Supreme Court’s Failure
Ultimately, the key question in appraising the Alaska Supreme
Court’s decision is whether terminally ill, competent adults should
have a right to physician-assisted suicide. None of us can answer
this question without reference to the experiences of our own
families and fears. Justice O’Connor recognized this in beginning
her concurring opinion in Glucksberg by observing that “[d]eath
will be different for each of us. For many, the last days will be
spent in physical pain and perhaps the despair that accompanies
physical deterioration and a loss of control of basic bodily and
73
mental functions.”
Ten years ago, as my father was dying of lung cancer, he asked
his doctor for medication to end his life. He was far too weak to
get out of his hospital bed, let alone act to end his own life. He either was in great pain or sedated into constant sleep. When he
awoke, he was lucid but obviously in enormous discomfort. A few
days before he died, he simply wanted it over. His doctor brushed
aside his request by ignoring it, though it was repeated several
times.
I cannot consider the constitutional issue of a right to physician-assisted suicide without having in mind the searing image of
my father in his hospital bed, gasping for each breath, and wanting
to end his pain. I cannot imagine any interest that the State had in
keeping my father alive for several additional days. If liberty
means anything, I think it must include a right, for those like my father, to die with dignity.
The Alaska Supreme Court erred in several ways in failing to
recognize this right. First, the court was wrong to determine
whether there is a fundamental right solely based on history and
tradition. Other privacy rights have been protected under the

71. Id. at 98.
72. Id.
73. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Alaska Constitution—such as the right to use marijuana74 and abor75
tion rights —even though there was no history or tradition of safeguarding these liberties. History and tradition can describe what
has been the practice; they cannot disclose what the Constitution
should mean.
Second, the Alaska Supreme Court failed to recognize the
profound importance of a right to physician-assisted suicide to the
right of privacy. As described earlier, the Alaska Supreme Court
previously had said that the very core of liberty “is the notion of total personal immunity from government control: the right to be let
76
alone.” Few, if any decisions, are more deeply personal or more
important than whether to end one’s life. Professor Tribe expressed this well when he wrote:
Of all decisions a person makes about his or her body, the most
profound and intimate relate to two sets of ultimate questions:
first, whether, when, and how one’s body is to become the vehicle for another human being’s creation; second, when and how—
this time there is no question of “whether”—one’s body is to
77
terminate its organic life.

Third, the Alaska Supreme Court overstated the problems of
recognizing a right to physician-assisted suicide. To be sure, the
court raised important concerns: protecting vulnerable individuals,
defining who is mentally competent, and determining who is termi78
nally ill. Yet, these problems do not justify the failure to recognize a right. Oregon has dealt with these concerns in its “Death
With Dignity” law allowing physician-assisted suicide, as have for79
eign countries such as the Netherlands. If the Alaska Supreme
Court had recognized such a right to physician-assisted suicide,
then the legislature almost certainly would have responded with
necessary statutes to regulate the practice.
The fundamental flaw in the Alaska Supreme Court decision
was in leaving the issue of physician-assisted suicide solely to the
legislative process. The Alaska Constitution’s express protection
of privacy gives the Alaska judiciary a key role in ensuring that ba74. E.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975).
75. E.g., State, Dep’t of Health and Social Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of
Alaska, Inc., 28 P.3d 904, 906 (Alaska 2001).
76. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 168 (Alaska 1972) (internal citation omitted).
77. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1337-38 (2d ed.
1988).
78. Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 96 (Alaska 2001).
79. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711 n.8 (1997) (citing Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342, 404 (Can.
1993)) (noting that in most western democracies it is a crime to assist suicide).
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sic aspects of privacy are protected from legislative intrusion. The
Alaska Supreme Court failed to answer the fundamental question:
why should the State force a terminally ill patient to continue to
live against his or her will? The Alaska Supreme Court should
have found that the law prohibiting physician-assisted suicide violates the most fundamental aspect of privacy: the right of a person
to choose whether to live or die.
III. DRUG TESTING
A. The United States Supreme Court’s Willingness to Allow Drug
Testing
Almost without exception, the Supreme Court has approved
government drug testing and refused to find that it violates the
Fourth Amendment despite the fact that the Court has clearly recognized that drug testing—examining a person’s blood or urine for
signs of drug use—is a search within the meaning of the Fourth
80
Amendment. The latter conclusion seems obvious, as drug testing
involves compelling a person to produce bodily fluids that are then
examined by the government to learn information about the individual.
As with any search, the government can require drug testing if
81
there is sufficient probable cause. The question is whether the
government can mandate drug testing based on less than probable
cause and, potentially, without any individualized suspicion whatsoever. Alarmingly, in several cases, the Supreme Court has approved warrantless, suspicionless drug testing.
82
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, the Court approved a federal law authorizing drug testing for railway workers
83
after an accident occured. The law also authorized drug testing
when there was reasonable suspicion that an employee was intoxicated or drug impaired and when there was a violation of safety
84
Skinner therefore did not involve entirely suspicionless
rules.
searches. The Supreme Court upheld the testing and emphasized

80. E.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)
(holding that collection and analysis of urine constitutes a search).
81. E.g., id. at 619 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)).
82. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
83. Id. at 634.
84. Id. at 611.
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that it was warranted by the government’s compelling interest in
85
railroad safety.
A more troubling case from a privacy perspective is National
86
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, in which the Supreme
Court approved suspicionless drug testing for customs workers who
87
were applying for promotions. The testing program was limited to
those who would be involved in the interdiction of drugs or who
88
would be carrying a firearm. The government did not claim that
there was any history of drug or alcohol abuse among customs
89
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the governworkers.
ment’s interest in ensuring that customs workers who were responsible for drug interdiction or were required to carry a firearm did
90
not use drugs warranted the invasion of privacy. The Court noted
that customs workers had access to contraband and could become
91
targets for bribes. This decision is troubling because the Court
did not require the government to demonstrate that testing based
on individualized suspicion would be inadequate to serve the government’s interest.
The Court also upheld random drug testing in two cases in92
volving students. In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the
Court deemed constitutional a school’s random drug testing of stu93
Justice Scalia,
dents participating in interscholastic athletics.
writing for the Court in a 5-4 decision, stressed the danger of sports
94
and the risk that a drug-impaired student could be injured. The
Court also said that the invasion of privacy was minimal since students already had to undergo physical exams and had to use public
95
locker rooms before and after an athletic practice or event. The
Court concluded that the invasion of privacy was justified because
of the school’s interest in preventing and detecting drug use among
96
its student athletes.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 633.
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
Id. at 679.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 673-74.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 669.
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
Id. at 664-66.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 656-57.
Id. at 661-63.
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Then last year, in Board of Education of Independent School
97
Dist. No. 92 of Pottowotomie County v. Earls, the Court upheld a
school district’s policy of requiring random drug testing as a condi98
tion for participation in extracurricular activities. This case was
quite different from Vernonia in a number of respects. The drug
testing program in Vernonia was limited to student athletes; Earls
involved drug testing of all students participating in extracurricular
activities. In fact, the challenger in Earls was a student who wanted
99
to sing in the school choir. There is obviously far less danger of
injury from singing than in athletic events. Also, there is not the
same diminished expectation of privacy in the choir as in the high
school locker room, which the Court stressed in Vernonia. Most
important, according to the court of appeals, the school district in
Earls did not claim or prove a significant drug problem among stu100
Rather, it said
dents participating in extracurricular activities.
101
that its goal was to prevent one from developing.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld the random drug
testing in another 5-4 decision. Justice Thomas, writing for the
Court, emphasized the school’s important interest in preventing
102
drug use and reasoned that this justified the invasion of privacy.
Justice Thomas said that random testing had the benefit of not requiring schools to accuse particular students of drug use in order to
103
This opinion is particularly troubling because it
justify testing.
would seemingly allow any school to require drug testing of any
student.
There are, however, two decisions in which the Supreme Court
104
rejected drug-testing requirements. In Chandler v. Miller, the
Court declared unconstitutional a Georgia statute which required
that a candidate, in order to qualify for nomination or election to a
105
state office, submit to and pass a drug test. The Court found that
there was no proof of a drug problem in Georgia among its elected
106
officials. Additionally, the Court found that there was no special
need for the drug testing of candidates for state office, unlike the

97. 536 U.S. 822 (2002), 122 S.Ct. 2559 (2002).
98. 122 S.Ct. at 2562.
99. Id. at 2563.
100. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1272-74 (10th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 122
S.Ct. 2559.
101. 122 S.Ct. at 2567-68.
102. Id. at 2567.
103. Id. at 2568-69.
104. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
105. Id. at 309.
106. Id. at 319.
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case of railroad workers involved in accidents or customs workers
107
Nor could candidates for elected
involved in drug interdiction.
office be analogized to students where schools have greater respon108
sibility and authority. The Court noted that the Georgia program
was likely to be only symbolic because the candidate could sched109
ule the test whenever he or she wanted.
110
Ferguson v. City of Charleston involved a public hospital’s
program of drug testing pregnant women suspected of abusing
drugs based on specific criteria from a profile generated by the
111
government. In a 6-3 decision, the Court declared this unconsti112
tutional. The record showed that positive drug test results were
turned over to law enforcement and presumably used as the basis
113
for criminal prosecutions of the women, and that women were
being arrested just hours after giving birth, often while still in their
114
hospital gowns and bleeding heavily. Thus, the Court concluded
that drug testing for law enforcement purposes must meet the re115
quirements of the Fourth Amendment.
Overall, the Supreme Court has been very supportive of drug
testing, particularly in the context of employment and education.
In these areas, the Court has been quite willing to find that the interest in deterring drug use outweighS the invasions of privacy.
B. The Alaska Supreme Court Approves Random Drug Testing
Some commentators have predicted that the greater protection of privacy under the Alaska Constitution would mean greater
116
But in its recent decision in
limits on drug testing in Alaska.
Alaska Police Department Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of An117
chorage, the Alaska Supreme Court approved suspicionless drug
107. Id. at 314-16, 318.
108. Id. at 316, 319.
109. Id. at 319. Further, the Court found the statute to be symbolic because
there was no evidence of drug abuse among elected officials. Id. at 321-22.
110. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
111. Id. at 71. The program actually provided for suspicionless testing because
it used a profile but not any individualized factors. See id. at 71 n.4.
112. Id. at 86.
113. See id. at 77 (emphasizing the lack of knowledge or consent of the patients).
114. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 488 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d 532
U.S. 67 (2001).
115. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84.
116. See Richard N. Cook, Drug Testing of Public and Private Employees in
Alaska, 5 ALASKA L. REV. 133, 154 (1988) (“[W]hile the federal test focuses on
the needs of the state, Alaska’s test is more concerned with the individual.”).
117. 24 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001).
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testing for police and firefighters applying for promotion or trans118
fer, as well as those involved in vehicle accidents. However, the
court did declare unconstitutional the city’s requirement for ran119
dom drug testing of its police and firefighters.
The Alaska Supreme Court began by noting that neither a
warrant nor probable cause is required to test employees involved
in such important positions. The court stated:
[O]ur case law expressly recognizes that neither the warrant requirement nor the requirement of probable cause invariably
governs searches occurring in the context of a heavily regulated
activity. And as the superior court properly recognized here,
“special needs” findings are especially appropriate when employment occurs in a highly regulated, safety-essential field of
120
work.

Quite significantly, the court concluded that “[w]orkers employed
in such fields necessarily expect reduced privacy in their job-related
activities and implicitly agree to a diminished level of privacy when
121
they accept employment.”
The court rejected the argument that the government must
122
prove a drug problem in order to justify testing. Since it found
that drug testing was a relatively minimal invasion of privacy, and
that the government’s interest in preventing drug use among its
police and firefighters was substantial, it is not surprising that the
court upheld a substantial part of Anchorage’s drug testing program. In agreeing with the lower court, the supreme court stated:
[T]he Municipality’s interest in ensuring public safety is sufficiently compelling to outweigh the relatively modest—though
admittedly not insignificant—intrusion on privacy that occurs
under the disputed Municipality policy when Police Employees
and Fire Fighters members are subjected to suspicionless urine

118. Id. at 557. In an earlier decision, Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc.,
768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989), the Alaska Supreme Court held that a private employer’s drug testing program did not violate the state constitutional right to privacy and thus upheld the firing of two employees for failure to submit to drug
testing. Id. at 1130. The court concluded that the Alaska Constitution’s privacy
provision did not apply to private, non-government conduct. Id. The court stated:
“[t]he parties in the case at bar have failed to produce evidence that Alaska’s constitutional right to privacy was intended to operate as a bar to private action . . . .”
Id.
119. Alaska Police Dep’t Employees Ass’n, 24 P.3d at 559.
120. Id. at 555 (citing Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 672 (1989)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 556.
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testing upon application for employment, upon promotion, de123
motion or transfer, or after a vehicular accident.

However, the court was not willing to go so far as to approve completely random testing. It said that “random testing places increased demands on employees’ reasonable expectation of pri124
vacy.” The court further noted that
random testing is more intrusive: it subjects employees to a
greater degree of subjective intrusion. An unannounced test’s
added element of “fear and surprise,” and its “unsettling show of
authority,” make random testing qualitatively more intrusive
than testing that is triggered by predictable, job-related occur125
rences such as promotion, demotion, and transfer.

Thus, the court concluded that “the Municipality has failed to meet
its burden of establishing a special need for its random testing pro126
vision.”
C. The Alaska Supreme Court’s Failure
Although the Alaska Supreme Court declared random drug
testing unconstitutional, it upheld drug testing without individualized suspicion for police officers and firefighters applying for pro127
motion or transfer or even being demoted. In doing so it failed to
provide significantly more protection under the Alaska Constitution than under the United States Constitution. In fact, the Alaska
Supreme Court’s decision is remarkably similar to the United
States Supreme Court’s ruling in National Treasury Union v. Von
128
Raab, which upheld suspicionless drug testing for customs work129
ers applying for promotion or transfer.
There are several problems with the Alaska Supreme Court’s
analysis. First, the court failed to justify the need for suspicionless
searches. The government can depart from the constitutional
mandate that searches be based on individualized suspicion only by
proving that a requirement for suspicion will undermine the effectiveness of its program. Yet the government made no such showing in Alaska Police Department Employees Ass’n v. Municipality
130
of Anchorage. Furthermore, the court did not even ask whether

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 556-57.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 558 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 559.
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
Id. at 679.
See 24 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001).

CHEMERINSKY_CORRECTED.DOC

46

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

05/07/03 4:36 PM

[20:1

suspicionless searches were needed to accomplish the government’s
131
purposes.
Second, the Alaska Supreme Court failed to give sufficient
weight to the well-established principle that the Alaska Constitution is given separate meaning, and often contains greater protec132
tions, than the United States Constitution. The Alaska Supreme
Court’s decision seemed heavily influenced, if not based on, federal
court decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The court began its opinion with a lengthy examination of United States Supreme Court rulings concerning drug
133
testing and the Fourth Amendment. Then, throughout its opinion, the court referred to federal appellate court decisions uphold134
In
ing suspicionless testing regimes in comparable situations.
fact, in declaring the random testing aspect of Anchorage’s program unconstitutional, the court looked to federal law and “note[d]
that the United States Supreme Court has never approved an open
135
ended random-testing regime like the one at issue here.”
The consistent focus on the United States Constitution and
federal court decisions is at odds with the tradition in Alaska, first
136
stated in Ravin v. State, of the separate meaning of Alaska consti137
tutional provisions and the independent analysis they require.
Early in Alaska’s statehood, the Alaska Supreme Court declared:
We are not bound in expounding the Alaska Constitution’s
Declaration of Rights by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, past or future, which expound identical or closely
similar provisions of the United States Constitution . . . . To
look only to the United States Supreme Court for constitutional
guidance would be an abdication by this court of its constitu138
tional responsibilities.

Independent interpretation and protection of rights is particularly important when the Alaska Constitution contains a provi131. Id.
132. Id. at 550.
133. Id. at 551-55 (examining Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67
(2001); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646 (1995); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)).
134. Id. at 557 & n.71.
135. Id. at 558 (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672, concerning the advance notification of drug testing).
136. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
137. See id. at 498, 500-01 (noting that Alaska employs a different test for rational basis scrutiny than the U.S. Supreme Court and that privacy is a specified
right under the Alaska Constitution).
138. Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342 (Alaska 1969).
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sion with no analogue in the United States Constitution. In Alaska
Police Department Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage,
the Alaska Supreme Court assumed that the privacy clause in the
Alaska Constitution should be interpreted and applied under the
principles used in the federal courts’ Fourth Amendment analy139
sis. The court never even acknowledged the greater protection of
privacy rights intended by the voter initiative that added privacy as
140
an enumerated right to the Alaska Constitution.
Finally, the Alaska Supreme Court’s balancing of privacy interests and government interests is questionable. The court concluded that the government’s interests outweigh the privacy inter141
On
ests implicated, but offered little analysis of this balancing.
one side of the balance are the privacy interests of employees, but
these are never explicated in the opinion. Drug testing invades
privacy rights in many respects: it is a search; it requires employees
to produce urine specimens in a manner that many find degrading
and embarrassing; it gives employers knowledge of what employees
are doing off the job, even when there is no showing of any relevance to job performance. There also is a real danger of false positives, meaning that employees can be subjected to adverse employment actions even though they have done nothing wrong.
On the other side of the balance is the government’s interest in
ensuring that police and firefighters never use drugs. Interestingly,
the court implicitly rejected this interest as sufficient to support
142
drug testing when it declared random testing unconstitutional.
Thus, the question is whether testing at the time of promotion, demotion, or transfer sufficiently serves the government’s interest to
warrant the invasion of privacy. This issue is not addressed by the
Alaska Supreme Court and it is difficult to see why the government’s interest at this stage outweighs the loss of privacy involved.
IV. CONCLUSION
For over a dozen years, I have had the tremendous pleasure of
going to Alaska each spring to speak at the Alaska Bar Association’s Annual Convention on recent developments in constitutional
law. Over this time, I have had the opportunity to meet and speak
with the Justices of the Alaska Supreme Court. I have developed
enormous admiration and respect for these Justices. No state has a
more impressive judiciary than does Alaska.

139.
140.
141.
142.

24 P.3d at 554.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 556-57.
Id. at 559.
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I have also come to understand Alaska’s deeply established
tradition of giving separate meaning to the Alaska Constitution
and often providing more protection for individual freedom than
exists under the United States Constitution. I vividly recall my first
trip to Alaska in 1990 and meeting Chief Justice Jay Rabinowitz,
the visionary and architect of so much Alaska constitutional law,
143
including the right to privacy, and hearing him eloquently speak
about Alaska’s judicial history.
It is in this context that I find the recent decisions of the
Alaska Supreme Court, rejecting a state constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide and upholding drug testing, to be troubling.
These are important areas of privacy—whether to live or die, and
privacy in the workplace—where the Alaska Supreme Court had
the opportunity to be a national leader. These are areas where the
Alaska Supreme Court could have found independent rights under
the Alaska Constitution’s privacy clause that are far more expansive than those guaranteed through the restrictive interpretations
by the United States Supreme Court of the United States Constitution. But unfortunately this did not occur and the promise of the
Alaska Constitution’s privacy clause was not realized.

143. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1975).

